


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Meeting No. 1261
22 October 74

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
DRAFT WATCH REPORT
for
WATCH COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

PKG FILE 07



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State Dept. review completed

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NIC DRAFT WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

No. 1261

22 October 1974

1 The Committee concludes that there will be
2 no military attack on the United States or
3 its overseas forces in the near future.

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4 Subjects of immediate concern are discussed
5 below.

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6
7 I. Middle East

8 1. The outcome of the approaching Arab summit conference
9 could lead to heightened tension in the area. It is expected,
10 however, that both sides will persevere in their efforts to
11 achieve a diplomatic settlement, and we continue to believe
12 that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities is unlikely
13 in the near term.

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14 2. We do not foresee a quick military solution to the
15 Iraqi-Kurdish conflict, and hostilities will probably grad-
16 ually subside into a stalemate with the onset of winter.

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21 II. USSR-Eastern Europe

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22 3. We see no indications of hostile intent in the military
23 activity of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations.

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24 III. Southeast Asia

25 4. In South Vietnam, we expect that the most significant
26 military action will continue in Military Region 1, although
27 the Communist capability to carry out major attacks there
28 will become more limited as seasonal rains increase. Viet
29 Cong terrorist attacks are increasing in the Saigon area.
30 Elsewhere, we expect a general lull in fighting for the im-
31 mediate future. [REDACTED]

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BACKUP

I. Middle East

ISRAEL-ARAB STATES

1a. Although current evidence indicates that all sides will continue to explore political options for a negotiated settlement, the Arabs and Israelis are fully prepared to resume the conflict with little or no warning.

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1b. Israeli Foreign Minister Allon stated recently that Israel is awaiting the outcome of the Arab summit conference, which will convene on 26 October, before making concrete plans for future negotiations. If the conference produces a unified Arab position that Israel considers so intransigent as to preclude any further compromise on territorial and/or political concessions, Tel Aviv may be encouraged to refocus on its military options.


SOVIET REACTIONS

1c. The visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi to Moscow resulted in an agreement for Brezhnev to visit Cairo in January, 1975--a concession to the Egyptians. Beyond this, it is not clear what agreements may have been reached and whether any substantial improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations was achieved. Various press comments and the absence of a communique suggest that there were difficulties in the discussions. It is evident that the Soviets urged a more rapid convening of the Geneva conference than is desired by Cairo, and the rather vague wording on this point reflects Egyptian sensitivities. A joint statement on the Palestinian question reaffirmed that the PLO should attend the Geneva conference on an equal basis with other participants and that a Middle East settlement must secure the rights of the Palestinians, including a "national entity."

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1d. Egyptian press statements have stressed that Moscow made economic concessions and that a new five-year trade protocol is being negotiated.

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BACKUP

I. Middle East

ISRAEL-ARAB STATES (cont'd)

1e. The Egyptian press has hailed the Fahmi visit as a triumph for Egypt's independent foreign policy. A dispatch from Moscow by the editor of Al-Ahram claimed that the Soviets now understand the need for Egypt to deal with the US and "have no objection" to this. It affirmed Cairo's view that Egypt is the key to the Middle East and that "it regulates the area's climate and the direction of its general movement. It is impossible to go over Egypt's head if any solution to any problem in the area is desired." The article also indicated that Moscow would remain the principal source of Egyptian arms but that this source would be complemented by other sources.

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22 October 1974

BACKUP

Cyprus-Greece-Turkey

The ceasefire was violated in Nicosia during the evening of 21 October when Greek and Turkish Cypriots exchanged machine gun, mortar and rifle fire across the Green Line which divides the two communities. The ceasefire was restored in about one hour by the intervention of the UN Peace force. Each side accused the other of initiating the action. This was the first incident of this kind along the Green Line in about three weeks.

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BACKUP

III. Southeast Asia

4a. In Military Region 1, a new government effort is reportedly under way to recapture Ma Tau mountain, southeast of Hue. Communist control of the mountain top has restricted government use of Phu Bai airbase to helicopters and small planes. Communist interdiction efforts throughout MR 1 have nearly exhausted annual road repair funds. [REDACTED]

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4b. There has been a marked increase in terrorist attacks near Saigon. Early reporting indicates VC plans to step up such action which is aimed at disrupting government communication lines and discrediting ARVN's security around Saigon. [REDACTED]

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